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UNITED STATES V. SAFEHOUSE: THE FUTURE OF
SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION SITES IN MAINE AND
BEYOND
Jeff Sherman*
ABSTRACT
People who use drugs are dying at an unprecedented rate. However, many of
these deaths can be prevented. When a person experiencing an opioid overdose is
timely treated with naloxone and oxygen the overdose is reversed. Access to a
supervised consumption site—a place where people can use pre-obtained drugs in
the safety and presence of others—ensures that when a person overdoses, they
receive this life-saving treatment. In response to a proposed supervised consumption
site in Philadelphia, the Department of Justice sued to prevent it from opening. The
government claimed that the facility, called “Safehouse,” would violate 21 U.S.C. §
856(a)(2) which makes it a crime to “manage or control [a] place . . . and knowingly
and intentionally . . . make [it] available for use . . . for the purpose of” drug activity.
This Note analyzes that case: United States v. Safehouse. In Safehouse, the
Third Circuit overturned the district court’s decision and held that supervised
consumption sites violate § 856(a)(2). The court’s reasoning, and the opinions of
the dissent and the district court, centered around statutory construction and who
must act “for the purpose of” drug activity. According to the majority’s construction,
Safehouse would violate the statute as long as the participants of the consumption
room act with the requisite purpose. According to the dissent and the district court’s
construction, it is Safehouse who must act “for the purpose of” drug activity. Based
on their construction, both the dissent and the district court determined that
Safehouse would not violate the statute because the purpose of a supervised
consumption site is to provide access to live-saving medical treatment and to reduce,
rather than facilitate, drug use.
Although the majority contends that its construction is consistent with the plain
meaning of the statute, the dissent and the district court’s alternative construction
demonstrates that the statute is ambiguous. This Note argues that the alternative
construction is more compelling because the dissent and district court resolve the
statute’s ambiguity by looking to the legislative history and in doing so avoid the
absurd consequences of the majority’s formalistic and mechanistic interpretation.
This Note posits that after Safehouse, there is hope of a supervised consumption site
in Maine. More specifically, it argues that, because of the competing constructions
of § 856(a)(2), a proposed supervised consumption site might not be prosecuted by
the U.S. Attorney for the District of Maine or could find success in the First Circuit.
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who is missed by his family. I am grateful for the time we had together. Special thanks to Professor
Daniel Pi and Katherine Elliot, University of Maine School of Law Class of 2022, for their thoughtful
advice and encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2020, more Mainers died of drug overdoses than from COVID-19.1 In total,
Maine lost 504 people to drug overdoses.2 The annual number of overdose deaths
has continued to increase over the last decade,3 and researchers at the University of
Maine estimate that 636 people died in 2021.4 The vast majority of drug overdose
deaths in Maine are caused by a combination of substances.5 In 2020, the most
common drug involved in an overdose death was an opioid.6 An “opioid” refers to
a drug made from the opium plant, such as morphine, codeine, heroin, or a synthetic
version with similar effects, such as oxycodone or hydrocodone.7 In recent years,
fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, has become more common.8 In 2020, 67% of drug
overdose deaths in Maine involved the substance.9 These tragic deaths are certainly
not unique to Maine. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
estimated that, in 2020, more than 90,000 people in America died of drug
overdoses.10 Currently, more Americans lose their lives as a result of a drug overdose
than from car crashes and gun fatalities combined.11
In response to rising overdose deaths, states have tried different methods of
treating people who use drugs. Supervised consumption sites12—places where

1. Joe Lawlor, Maine’s Death Rate Rose by 4.5% Last Year, Driven Largely by COVID-19,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.pressherald.com/2021/04/25/maines-death-raterose-by-4-5-last-year-driven-largely-by-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/59GE-7MJS] (reporting 422 deaths
from COVID-19 and more than 500 deaths from drug overdoses).
2. MARCELLA H. SORG, MARGARET CHASE SMITH POL’Y CTR.: U. ME., MAINE DRUG DEATH
REPORT FOR 2020 3 (2021).
3. Drug Overdose Deaths in Maine, MARGARET CHASE SMITH POL’Y CTR.: U. ME., https://
mcspolicycenter.umaine.edu/mcspc-research/drug-overdose-deaths/
[https://perma.cc/FEV2-GXMA]
(last visited May 13, 2022) (showing rise in number of drug overdose deaths from 167 in 2010 to 504 in
2020).
4. Randy Billings, Maine Shattered its Annual Record for Overdose Deaths in 2021, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.pressherald.com/2022/01/19/maine-shatters-annual-recordfor-overdose-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/3ZTQ-5CNH] (noting a 23% increase in overdose deaths from
2020).
5. SORG, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that in 2020, 81% of drug related deaths involved more than one
drug).
6. Id. (noting that in 2020, 83% of drug-related deaths involved either a pharmaceutical or
nonpharmaceutical opioid).
7. CARL L. HART & CHARLES KSIR, DRUGS, SOCIETY & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 291, 300 (17th ed.
2018).
8. See generally BEN WESTHOFF, FENTANYL INC.: HOW ROGUE CHEMISTS ARE CREATING THE
DEADLIEST WAVE OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC (2019) (detailing the rise in the manufacture, sale, and use of
fentanyl).
9. SORG, supra note 2, at 7.
10. Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Overdose Deaths May Have Topped 90,000 in
2020, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/07/health-202overdose-deaths-may-have-topped-90000-2020 [https://perma.cc/QK4T-3MEJ].
11. Roni Caryn Rabin, Overdose Deaths Reached Record High as the Pandemic Spread, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/17/health/drug-overdoses-fentanyl-deaths.html
[https://perma.cc/QGJ3-RQKF].
12. Supervised consumption sites are also commonly referred to as safe injection sites, overdose
prevention centers, supervised injection facilities and drug consumption rooms. Overdose Prevention

306

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

people use pre-obtained drugs under the supervision of trained staff—are part of the
strategy to prevent overdose deaths internationally but face significant obstacles in
the United States from federal law enforcement. For instance, in 2018, the
Philadelphia-based non-profit “Safehouse” attempted to become the first supervised
consumption site in the United States but was prevented from opening as a result of
a lawsuit brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ). This Note focuses on that
case: United States v. Safehouse.13
This Note first discusses how the treatment of people who use drugs has evolved
over time, the rise of harm reduction, and the promise of supervised consumption
sites. Section II of this Note examines the legislative history and enforcement of 21
U.S.C. § 856, the federal law that supervised consumption sites allegedly violate.
Section III discusses United States v. Safehouse, the first case analyzing whether
supervised consumption sites violate federal law and the merits of the Third Circuit’s
decision. Section IV discusses policy considerations. Finally, Section V considers
the path forward for supervised consumption sites in Maine.
A. Historical Treatment of People Who Use Drugs
Opioids have been popular throughout American history and were legal until the
early 20th Century.14 When opioids were sold legally the typical opioid user was a
middle-class white woman.15 This use was generally socially acceptable and the user
typically treated withdrawal symptoms by taking less expensive and more widely
available opioids.16 Many factors, including racial animus towards black men and
Chinese immigrants, led Congress to pass the Harrison Narcotics Act which resulted
in, among other things, a restriction in access to legal opioids.17 By the 1950s, the
typical opioid user was a lower-class male who intravenously injected illegal
heroin.18 With this change, the public perception of the people who used opioids
devolved from victims who were worthy of sympathy and medical treatment to
criminals who deserved punishment.19

Centers, DRUG POL’Y ALL., https://drugpolicy.org/issues/supervised-consumption-services [https://
perma.cc/4DCT-DZV8] (last visited May 13, 2022).
13. United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021).
14. See, e.g., MARTIN BOOTH, OPIUM: A HISTORY 73-74, 191-92 (St. Martin’s Press ed., 1998)
(describing opium and morphine use during the Revolutionary and Civil Wars); HART & KSIR, supra note
7, at 294-30; CARL L. HART, DRUG USE FOR GROWN-UPS: CHASING LIBERTY IN THE LAND OF FEAR 32
(Penguin Press ed., 2021).
15. HART & KSIR, supra note 7, at 295; see also Laura I. Appleman, Opioids, Addiction Treatment,
and the Long Tail of Eugenics, 80 OHIO STATE L.J. 841, 848 (2019).
16. HART & KSIR, supra note 7, at 294-95.
17. Id.; HART, supra note 14, at 33-34. See generally Harrison Narcotics Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38
Stat. 785 (1914). The Harrison Narcotics Act did not directly prohibit the use or possession of opioids,
and white people “with means or access to a physician” continued to use opioids legally with a
prescription. HART, supra note 14, at 33-34. Alternatively, those with lower social capital faced
increasingly punitive measures. Id. at 34.
18. HART & KSIR, supra note 7, at 297.
19. Id. See generally Appleman, supra note 15, at 848-51 (“Beginning the early 20th century, the
public, recognized face of the typical opiate addict – middle class, middle-aged Anglo-Saxon white female
– began to transform into the far more threatening poor urban residents, who were often categorized as
street criminals.”).
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B. Harm Reduction
Throughout the last century, criminalization has been the government’s primary
strategy for addressing both drug use and addiction.20 However, in recent years,
harm reduction strategies have become increasingly accepted in the United States21
as a more compassionate and cost-effective method of reducing the adverse health,
social, and economic consequences of drug use.22 Harm reduction strategies
prioritize reducing these adverse consequences over abstinence and treatment.23 This
is important because it provides options that would otherwise be unavailable to
people who are unable or unwilling to stop using drugs.24 One common class of
harm reduction strategies is syringe exchange programs which provide people who
use intravenous drugs access to sterile equipment.25 Like many states, Maine has
implemented harm reduction strategies in combination with efforts in prevention,
treatment, and recovery.26
Central to Maine’s harm reduction strategy is providing access to naloxone.27
An excessive dose of an opioid or the combination of an opioid and a depressant,
such as alcohol, can depress the respiratory centers of the brain, making it difficult
or impossible to breathe.28 Naloxone is an opioid antagonist that quickly reverses
respiratory depression by binding to opioid receptors in the brain and displacing the
drug in the person’s system.29 To prevent death or other consequences from
prolonged respiratory depression, naloxone must be administered “in a timely
manner.”30 Thus, Maine has implemented strategies to make naloxone more
common at the scene of an overdose and recommends that every person who uses

20. HART & KSIR, supra note 7, at 57-69, 297.
21. Harm Reduction’s Road From Fringe to Federal Drug Policy, TRADEOFFS (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://tradeoffs.org/2022/01/27/harm-reduction-drugs-substance-use/ [https://perma.cc/FMB5-VSSQ].
22. See What Is Harm Reduction?, HARM REDUCTION INT’L, https://www.hri.global/what-is-harmreduction [https://perma.cc/H2EQ-ECXF] (last visited May 13, 2022).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See HART & KSIR, supra note 7, at 27-28. See generally Melissa Vallejo, Note, Safer Bathrooms
in Syringe Exchange Programs: Injecting Progress into the Harm Reduction Movement, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1185, 1194-201 (2018) (describing the history and legal structure of syringe exchange programs).
In Maine, syringe exchange programs have been part of the harm reduction strategy since 1997. See 22
M.R.S. § 1341 (2021). In 2021, this strategy was expanded with the decriminalization of syringes and
other safer use equipment like fentanyl test strips. P.L. 2021, ch. 434.
26. See GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF POL’Y INNOVATION & THE FUTURE, MAINE’S OPIOID RESPONSE: 2021
STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN (2021).
27. See id.
28. HART & KSIR, supra note 7, at 305. An overdose death caused by an excessive dose of a single
opioid drug represents only about a quarter of all opioid deaths. HART, supra note 14, at 35. Although
inconsistent testing and reporting obscure the data on overdose cause of death, many more fatal overdoses
are caused by contaminated opioids or opioids taken in combination with a depressant. See id. at 35, 6365 (“People are not dying because of opioids; they are dying because of ignorance.”).
29. HART & KSIR, supra note 7, at 305.
30. See Lisa Chimbar & Yvette Moleta, Naloxone Effectiveness: A Systematic Review, 29 J.
ADDICTIONS NURSING 167, 167 (2018).
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drugs carry it, regardless of what drug they are using.31 Since 2016, naloxone has
been available to anyone in Maine without the need for a prescription.32 Notably,
Governor Janet Mills made naloxone distribution a priority in 2019,33 and since then
the state has distributed more than 100,000 doses.34
However, distribution alone is not enough. Administering naloxone does not
guarantee an overdose reversal and Maine health officials recommend calling 911
for additional assistance before administering naloxone.35 OPTIONS, an initiative
of the Maine Office of Behavioral Health, recommends using drugs in groups to
ensure that another person is there to call 911 if there is an overdose.36 However,
fear of arrest and criminal prosecution for possession of drugs often prevents people
from calling for help.37 To encourage 911 calls, Maine’s Good Samaritan law grants
limited criminal immunity to people who call 911 and people experiencing an
overdose.38
While the state has experienced some success with this strategy, overdose deaths
have not decreased. When naloxone is not available in time, people die. This has
led many people, both nationally39 and in Maine,40 to advocate for the addition of
supervised consumption services to existing harm reduction strategies.

31. See Safer Drug Use Practices, OPTIONS, https://knowyouroptions.me/safer-drug-practices/
[https://perma.cc/CGR7-HFYU] (last visited May 13, 2022) (Overdose Prevention Through Intensive
Outreach Naloxone and Safety (OPTIONS) initiative).
32. See P.L. 2016, ch. 508 (allowing pharmacists to dispense naloxone “to an individual at risk of
experiencing an opioid-related drug overdose”).
33. See Me. Exec. Order No. 2 FY 19/20 (Feb. 6, 2019).
34. MARGARET CHASE SMITH POL’Y CTR., UNIV. OF ME., MAINE NALOXONE DISTRIBUTION
INITIATIVE: PROJECT-TO-DATE TOTALS THROUGH JUNE 30, 2021, 2 tbl.1 (2021).
35. Responding to an Overdose, OPTIONS, https://knowyouroptions.me/respond-to-overdose/
[https://perma.cc/7ZLK-H2T4] (last visited May 13, 2022).
36. OPTIONS, supra note 31.
37. KARLA D. WAGNER ET AL., POST-OVERDOSE INTERVENTIONS TRIGGERED BY CALLING 911:
CENTERING THE PERSPECTIVES OF PEOPLE WHO USE DRUGS 3 (2019).
38. 17-A M.R.S. § 1111-B (2021); P.L. 2022, ch. 724 (protecting the person who calls for assistance,
any person “rendering aid,” and the person experiencing a drug-related overdose from arrest or
prosecution for all crimes except those enumerated in § 1111-B(1)(A)); see also 22 M.R.S. § 2353(5)
(2021) (extending civil, criminal, and professional immunity to a person who injures another person while
administering naloxone).
39. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Med. Assoc., AMA Wants New Approaches to Combat Synthetic
and Injectable Drugs (June 12, 2017).
40. See, e.g., An Act to Prevent Overdose Deaths: Hearing on L.D. 949 Before the J. Standing Comm.
On Health and Hum. Servs., 129 Legis. (2019) (testimony of Meagan Sway, ACLU of Maine) (testimony
of Kenney Miller, Health Equity Alliance) (testimony of Taryn Hallweaver, Maine People’s Alliance)
(testimony of Caitlin Corrigan, Preble Street); Editorial Board, Our View: With New Maine Law, Harm
Reduction Comes First, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.pressherald.
com/2021/10/20/our-view-with-new-maine-law-harm-reduction-comes-first
[https://perma.cc/6YLXJXXC] (“We should also consider safe injection sites . . . .”). In 2021, many of these same activists in
Maine advocated to decriminalize drug possession for personal use. See, e.g., Megan Gray, Bill to Make
Drug Possession for Personal Use a Civil Violation Fails After Senate Vote, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(July 1, 2021), https://www.pressherald.com/2021/07/01/maine-senate-rejects-bill-that-would-makedrug-possession-for-personal-use-a-civil-violation [https://perma.cc/CE7Y-V7CB]. See generally L.D.
967 (130th Legis. 2021). Although a decriminalization bill passed the House of Representatives, it failed
to pass the Senate and faced opposition from members of Governor Janet Mills’ administration. Gray,
supra; see also An Act to Make Possession of Scheduled Drugs for Personal Use a Civil Penalty: Hearing
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C. Supervised Consumption Sites
A supervised consumption site ensures that naloxone and oxygen are present
during an overdose by allowing people “to consume pre-obtained drugs under the
supervision of trained staff.”41 Staff trained in overdose prevention and resuscitation
using naloxone can ensure that overdoses are responded to immediately.42
Additionally, supervised consumption sites aim to lower disease transmission,
reduce drug use in public places, and offer people who use drugs access to treatment,
counseling, and other social services.43
The first supervised consumption site opened in 1986 in Bern, Switzerland, and
since then, approximately 120 supervised consumption sites have opened in eleven
countries.44 In 2003, the first North American supervised consumption site opened
in Vancouver, British Columbia.45 Notably, there have been more than 3.6 million
visits to the site and 6,440 overdose interventions, yet there have been zero reported
deaths.46 An unsanctioned supervised consumption site in the United States has
operated since 2014 with similar success.47 However, the American site has been
operating in secret, without the ability to integrate other services.48 Despite the lack
of services available at the secret site, there has yet to be a reported death.49 While
disagreement exists on the degree of effectiveness of these sites, studies have
generally found that supervised consumption sites save lives, reduce disease, and
have positive impacts within the community.50 Importantly, supervised consumption
sites accomplish these goals without increasing drug use.51
On L.D. 967 Before the Comm. On Crim. Just. And Pub. Safety., 130th Legis. (2021) (testimony of Aaron
Frey, Attorney General) (testimony of Roy McKinney, Director of the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency).
41. DRUG POL’Y ALL., supra note 12.
42. Alex Kreit, Safe Injection Sites and the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60 B.C. L. REV. 413, 421
(2019).
43. Drug Consumption Rooms: An Overview of Provision and Evidence, EUR. MONITORING CTR.
FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION (July 6, 2018), https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/
publications/2734/POD_Drug%20consumption%20rooms.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UE7-EAD8].
44. DRUG POL’Y ALL., supra note 12 (including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United States).
45. Mehmet Zülfü Öner, An Overview of Drug Consumption Rooms, 4 HUM. RTS. REV. 87, 115
(2014). See generally TRAVIS LUPICK, FIGHTING FOR SPACE: HOW A GROUP OF DRUG USERS
TRANSFORMED ONE CITY’S STRUGGLE WITH ADDICTION 257-83 (2017).
46. Insite User Statistics, VANCOUVER COASTAL HEALTH, http://www.vch.ca/public-health/harmreduction/supervised-consumption-sites/insite-user-statistics [https://perma.cc/3YU9-NDWE] (last
visited May 13, 2022).
47. See Peter J. Davidson et. al., Using Drugs in Un/safe Spaces: Impact of Perceived Illegality on
an Underground Supervised Injecting Facility in the United States, 53 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 37, 38 (2018).
48. Id. at 42.
49. Id. at 38.
50. See Chloé Potier et al., Supervised Injection Services: What Has Been Demonstrated? A
Systematic Literature Review, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 49, 62-65 (2014); BEAU KILMER ET
AL., CONSIDERING HEROIN-ASSISTED TREATMENT AND SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION SITES IN THE UNITED
STATES xxii, 31-38 (2018).
51. Potier et al., supra note 50, at 63. Even without supervised consumption sites, less than one-third
of the people who use heroin become dependent. Olga J. Santiago Rivera, Risk of Heroin Dependence in
Newly Incident Heroin Users, 75 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 863, 864 (2018). The risk of developing an opioiduse disorder increases when a person is young, lacks social support, experiences childhood adversity, or
suffers from a mental health disorder. Lynn R. Webster, Risk Factors for Opioid-Use Disorder and
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International success led many United States cities and states to seriously
consider supervised consumption sites as a strategy to prevent overdoses. For
example, in 2021, Rhode Island became the first state to officially sanction a plan.52
Additionally, in November 2021, two supervised consumption sites opened in New
York City with the support of city officials.53 In Maine, organizations like the Church
of Safe Injection have continuously advocated to state and local officials to take a
more humane approach towards people who use drugs.54 For instance, in 2019, State
Representative Michael Sylvester proposed legislation to create two supervised
consumption facilities in Maine.55
In 2018, a Philadelphia-based nonprofit was founded with the goal of becoming
the country’s first supervised consumption site, which it later named “Safehouse.”56
Similar to exemplary international models, Safehouse planned to integrate its
supervised consumption room with other resources such as social services, legal
services, and housing resources.57
Despite local interest in testing the success of these sites, efforts to open
supervised consumption sites were met with federal hostility under the Trump
Administration. For example, in response to several proposals across the country,
then Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein called supervised consumption sites
“taxpayer-sponsored haven[s] to shoot up” and promised to meet the opening of any

Overdose, 125 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1741, 1743 (2017). By integrating other services, supervised
consumption sites aim to reduce these factors.
52. 2021 R.I. Pub. Laws 324; see also Julie Wernau, Rhode Island Set to Be First State to Pilot SafeInjection Sites for Drug Users, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rhode-islandset-to-be-first-state-to-pilot-safe-injection-sites-for-drug-users-11635067801
[https://perma.cc/Y9C2RM2M].
53. Jeffrey C. Mays & Andy Newman, Nation’s First Supervised Drug-Injection Sites Open in New
York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/nyregion/supervised-injectionsites-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/RAD9-PWBF]; see also Jennifer Peltz, A Look Inside the 1st Official
‘Safe Injection Sites’ in US, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 9, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/inside-nycsupervised-drug-injection-sites-7ad93117d1566fda53909c0f70984d1b [https://perma.cc/QQT5-729H]
(“In their first three months, the sites . . . halted more than 150 overdoses during about 9,500 visits – many
of them repeat visits from some 800 people in all.”).
54. Jesse Harvey, Opinion, Maine Voices: Church of Safe Injection Treats Drug Users as Jesus Would
Have Done, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/10/18/mainevoices-church-of-safe-injection-treats-addicts-as-jesus-would-have-done/
[https://perma.cc/A4HFE5KP]; Editorial, Our View: A ‘Church’ That Wants to Save Lives, Not Souls, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/11/02/our-view-a-church-that-wants-to-save-livesnot-souls/ [https://perma.cc/R5WK-KJC7].
55. L.D. 949 (129th Legis. 2019). Notably, this legislative effort was opposed by Roy McKinney,
Director of the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency, who testified against the legislation on behalf of the
Department of Public Safety. An Act to Prevent Overdose Deaths: Hearing on L.D. 949 Before the J.
Standing Comm. on Health & Hum. Servs., 129th Legis. (2019) (testimony of Roy McKinney, Director
of the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency).
56. Aubrey Whelan & Jeremy Roebuck, Philly’s Journey to a Supervised Injection Site Spans Years
as Overdose Rates Soar, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 10, 2022), https://www.inquirer.com/health/opioidaddiction/supervised-injection-site-overdose-crisis-philadelphia-timeline-20220210.html [https://perma.
cc/2YVQ-VQC8].
57. The Safehouse Model, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/about/the-safehouse-model
[https://perma.cc/V4WM-2F3W] (last visited May 13, 2022).
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facility with “swift and aggressive action.”58 Because users supply their own drugs
and staff do not directly handle drugs themselves, it is unlikely that supervised
consumption sites violate federal drug possession or distribution laws.59 The DOJ,
however, warned that supervised consumption sites and their staff would violate 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(2),60 a rarely used provision of the Controlled Substances Act of
1970 that imposes criminal and civil penalties for making property available to others
“for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a
controlled substance.”61 In light of these comments, it was unsurprising when the
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania filed suit against
Safehouse seeking a declaration that supervised consumption sites violated §
856(a)(2).62
II. 21 U.S.C. § 856: THE “CRACK HOUSE” STATUTE
A. Crimes Established in 21 U.S.C. § 856
Formally titled “[m]aintaining drug-involved premises,” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)
establishes two separate crimes, making it unlawful to either:
(a)(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether permanently
or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any
controlled substance; [or to]
(a)(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as
an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant or mortgagee, and knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without
compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance.63

58. Rod J. Rosenstein, Opinion, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/opioids-heroin-injection-sites.html [https://perma.cc/XX
H6-VGZT]; see also John W. Huber & David Backman, Uncivil Disobedience: A Selfish Threat to the
Rule of Law, 67 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 47, 47-49 (2019) (describing supervised consumption sites as “an
emerging threat to the rule of law” and vowing that the DOJ would act as the “primary resistance” to
efforts to open sites).
59. Kreit, supra note 42, at 417.
60. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off.: Dist. of Colo., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Joint Statement of the U.S.
Att’y’s Off. & the Denver Field Off. of the Drug Enf’t Admin. Regarding the City & Cnty. of Denver’s
Proposal to Create Supervised Locations to Inject Heroin & Other Illegal Drugs (Dec. 4, 2018); see also
Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off.: Dist. of Vt., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement of the U.S. Att’y’s Off.
Concerning Proposed Injection Sites (Dec. 13, 2017) (outlining the “ramifications under federal law” if
local officials pursued a proposal to open a supervised consumption site); Andrew Lelling, Opinion, Safe
Injection Sites Aren’t Safe or Legal, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
opinion/2019/01/28/opinion-andrew-lelling-safe-injection-sites-aren-safe-legal/T5OhtHD3b7jR0a5kGP
8mtL/story.html [https://perma.cc/4VYK-VHKD] (“These sites are a terrible idea and, more important,
they are illegal.”). Andrew Lelling was the United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts at
the time of writing. Id.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
62. Complaint at 2, United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 2:19-cv00519-GAM).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)-(2).
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Violating this law triggers both criminal and civil penalties. Criminally, an
individual who violates either provision under § 856(a) can face up to twenty years
in prison and a fine of up to $500,000.64 Any entity charged criminally with violating
this statute can face a fine of $2,000,000.65 If convicted of a civil violation of this
statute, a person is subject to penalties up to $250,000 or two times the total sales
“from each violation that is attributable to the person,” whichever is greater.66
B. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
21 U.S.C. § 856 was first enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.67
The statute is often referred to as the “crack house” statute because it was passed
“during the moral panic surrounding crack cocaine” with the aim of addressing socalled “crack-houses.”68
By targeting crack houses, § 856 gave politicians an opportunity to appear tough
on drugs, meeting the political moment.69 General fears over the rise in crack cocaine
turned into congressional action after college basketball star Len Bias died from a
suspected crack cocaine overdose.70 Although later reports revealed that Bias had
used powder cocaine on the day he died,71 the momentum for sweeping legislation
was already directed towards crack cocaine.72 As a result of the media attention
surrounding Len Bias’ overdose,73 a “hysterical” electorate influenced by
“inflammatory claims” about the risks of crack cocaine,74 and federal legislators

64. Id. § 856(b).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 856(d).
67. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1841, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-52 (1986). The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is remembered most for establishing mandatory minimum sentences that
“required 100 times more powder cocaine than crack cocaine to trigger the more severe minimum
sentence.” LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY,
POLICY, AND TRENDS 9 (2014).
68. Kreit, supra note 42, at 429. By 1986, crack cocaine, a significantly cheaper alternative to powder
cocaine, had become increasingly accessible in large U.S. cities. DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN
MCCURDY, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST
FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 1 (2006).
69. See Alex Kreit, The Opioid Crisis and the Drug War at a Crossroads, 80 OHIO STATE L.J. 887,
903 (2019) (arguing that § 856 did not “fill a real gap in the law” because drug manufacturing and
possession were already federal crimes).
70. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2010).
71. Id. On the night he died, Bias used cocaine for the first time and his death was caused by an
allergic reaction. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 128 (2001). Furthermore, fear of arrest prevented
Bias’ friends from seeking medical attention until midway through his third convulsion. Id. at 128-29 (“If
not for our drug prohibitionist laws, Len Bias . . . would probably still be alive today.”).
72. Luna & Cassell, supra note 70, at 25-26.
73. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 27,173 (1986) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (explaining that
Len Bias’ death “highlighted the scope and seriousness of the drug problem and dramatized the need for
swift and forceful action.”); 132 CONG. REC. 32,722 (1986) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley) (attributing
“the very widely publicized death of basketball star, Len Bias” with making crack cocaine “the No. 1
domestic concern of the American people.”).
74. Luna & Cassell, supra note 70, at 25. See generally HART, supra note 14, at 23-24, 202-10
(detailing the moral panic surrounding crack cocaine).
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swept up in a moral panic,75 the 1986 act was pushed through Congress and “enacted
without hearings or input from experts.”76
Closing crack houses was consistently mentioned as the aim of the provision.
Representative William Hughes summarized it as “a provision making it a crime to
operate a crack house or a stash house for drugs.”77 Similarly in the Senate, the
entirety of a section-by-section analysis printed in the record explained that the
provision “[o]utlaws [the] operation of houses or buildings, so-called ‘crack houses’,
where ‘crack’, cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used.”78 According to
advocates of the bill, a crack house involved criminal activity that went beyond the
casual user.79 Senator Lawton Chiles, a sponsor of the bill, defined crack houses as
“the places where users congregate to purchase and use crack.”80 This was the
contemporaneous view of the DOJ, which explained that despite the absence of an
official legislative history, § 856 appeared to be “aimed at ‘crack houses’ and
‘shooting galleries.’”81
Furthermore, the congressional debate described § 856 as a tool that prosecutors
needed in order to arrest and convict otherwise criminal behavior. Before discussing
§ 856, Senator Chiles explicitly stated that “[c]urrent law makes it very difficult to
arrest and convict crack dealers and traffickers,” and discussed how police “have
difficulty arresting the operators of crack houses.”82 21 U.S.C. § 856 was specifically
envisioned as a tool for prosecutors to solve this problem.83

75. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 26,447 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles) (alleging that just a
small amount of crack cocaine can “make people into slaves” and “turn promising young people into
robbers and thieves”); 132 CONG. REC. 19,241 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles) (describing crack
cocaine as a “growing plague” and claiming that people who use crack cocaine “lose all scruples and
morals and become thieves and killers”).
76. Luna & Cassell, supra note 70, at 25; see also Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug
Prohibition Politics and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 408 (1995) (describing the process as
“extraordinary” because normal legislative procedures were “circumvented” and “the careful, deliberate
procedures of Congress were set aside in order to expedite passage of the bill”).
77. 132 CONG. REC. 29,613 (1986) (statement of Rep. William Hughes).
78. 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986). Senator Chiles repeated this language four days later when he
explained that the bill would “outlaw[] crack houses.” 132 CONG. REC. 27,180 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Lawton Chiles).
79. In fact, the title for the provision was “Establishment of Manufacturing Operations” and the bill
was under the subtitle “Manufacturing Operations.” See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99570, § 1841, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
80. 132 CONG. REC. 19,241 (1986) (statement by Sen. Lawton Chiles); see also id. at 19, 245, 19,249
(statements by Sen. Joseph Biden and Sen. George Mitchell) (defining a crack house as a place where
crack cocaine is “produced, sold, and used” in the context of the Emergency Crack Control Act of 1986,
a predecessor to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986). See generally Emergency Crack Control Act of 1986,
S. 2715, 99th Cong. (1986).
81. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., CRIM. DIV. HANDBOOK ON THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 106
(1987).
82. 132 CONG. REC. 26,447 (1986).
83. See 132 CONG. REC. 29,613 (1986) (statement of Rep. William Hughes) (“[T]here often is a lot
of discussion about sending signals to drug traffickers. This bill doesn’t just send signals; this bill provides
major new tools for prosecuting drug traffickers.”).
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C. The PROTECT Act of 2003
21 U.S.C. § 856 was amended to its current language as part of the PROTECT
Act of 2003.84 This amendment extended liability to people managing or using either
permanent or temporary places, allowing § 856 to reach “indoor or outdoor venues
and one-off events.”85 The PROTECT Act aimed to help vulnerable young people
through a series of laws aimed at preventing child abuse and added tools for
investigating and prosecuting violent crimes against children.86 To this end, the
reach of § 856 was extended to address the growing concern of teenage ecstasy use
at raves.87 Congress was specifically targeting predatory behavior directed towards
young people. Then-Senator Joe Biden, a sponsor of the bill, explained that “[t]he
bill [was] aimed at the defendant’s predatory behavior, regardless of the type of drug
or the particular place in which the drug [was] being used or distributed.”88
Additionally, Congress amended § 856 to provide prosecutors the tools to go
after raves. Senator Grassley, a co-sponsor of the PROTECT Act, explained that
Congress’ goal was to “update the laws that have been effectively used to shut down
crack houses so they can go after temporary events used as a cover to sell drugs.”89
Senator Biden explained his intention was to extend § 856 to outdoor events as well
as parties “where the promoter sponsors the event with the purpose of distributing
Ecstasy or other illegal drugs.”90
Critics of the amendment worried that the proposed expansion would extend
criminal liability beyond “property owners who have been directly involved in
committing drug offenses.”91 Senator Biden, a proponent of the change, responded
by explaining that the bill would not apply to “legitimate business[es].”92 Biden

84. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 6, 50 (2003). This amendment was first introduced in 2002 as the
RAVE Act. See Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of 2002, S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 3(a)
(2002); see also Kreit, supra note 42, at 430, n.95. In 2003, the bill was reintroduced by Senator Joe
Biden as the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003 and attached as a rider to the PROTECT Act. Id.
85. Kreit, supra note 42, at 430; see 149 CONG. REC. 1,678 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
86. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 03-266, FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT (2003) (describing the problems
addressed by the PROTECT Act and the Act’s solution to those problems); Statement on Signing the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 400-01 (Apr. 30, 2003) (explaining that the PROTECT Act “gives law enforcement authorities
valuable new tools to deter, detect, investigate, prosecute, and punish crimes against America’s children”).
87. Kreit, supra note 42, at 430.
88. 149 CONG. REC. 9,383 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) (“I hope that the changes made
by the conference report before us today will make promoters think twice before endangering kids in this
manner.”); see also 149 CONG. REC. 1,848 (2003) (statement by Sen. Charles Grassley) (describing the
amendment as an effort to “update our laws so they can be used effectively against drug dealers who are
pushing drugs on our kids”).
89. 149 CONG. REC. 1,849 (2003) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
90. 149 CONG. REC. 1,847 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden); see 149 CONG. REC. 9,383 (2003)
(statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) (“The bill provides federal prosecutors the tools needed to combat the
manufacture, distribution or use of any controlled substance at any venue whose purpose is to engage in
illegal narcotics activity.”).
91. 149 CONG. REC. 9,378 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
92. 149 CONG. REC. 9,384 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden); see also 149 CONG. REC. 1,849
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) (explaining that the crack house statute “has not, nor should it be
used, to take action against every landlord or every property where drug activity takes place”).
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explained that the bill would exclusively target “rogue promoters who not only know
that there is drug use at their event but also hold the event for the purpose of illegal
drug use or distribution” and that this standard creates “quite a high bar.”93 This did
not include “law abiding people who are going to discourage drug use.”94 Senator
Biden was clear that the bill would not create a “disincentive for promoters to take
steps to protect the public health of their patrons.”95 Therefore, public health
measures, which in the context of a rave, included “providing water or air
conditioned rooms,” and “having an ambulance on hand,” would “not [be] enough
to signify that an event is ‘for the purpose of’ drug use.”96 Instead, the bill would
apply only to promoters “who are taking steps to profit from drug activity.”97
Accordingly, Senator Biden defined this group as people with a direct connection to
drug use,98 and those who take actions to facilitate its use.99
D. 21 U.S.C. § 856 in Practice: Chen and its Progeny
21 U.S.C. § 856 is a tool that federal prosecutors rarely use. In 2020, only
seventeen federal defendants nationwide were sentenced with § 856 as their primary
offense.100 This number dwarfs in comparison to the 16,287 total federal drug
offenders sentenced in 2020.101 Because § 856 is not subject to the mandatory
minimum penalties that are required by most other federal drug offenses, some have
argued that the “most common use” of the statute is as a plea negotiation tool.102
Prosecutors commonly use the crack house statute “to target property owners with
close ties to the drug activities occurring on their property.”103 However, under §
856(a)(2), it is unclear what it means to manage a property “for the purpose of” drug
activity.104 Therefore, as the Fifth Circuit demonstrated in United States v. Chen,105
the statue has the potential to cover a wide range of criminal behavior.
In Chen, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the conviction of
a hotel owner who was found guilty of violating § 856(a)(1) and (a)(2) based on the
district court’s use of a deliberate ignorance jury instruction.106 The district court

93. 149 CONG. REC. 9,384 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
94. Id.
95. 149 CONG. REC. 1,678 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
96. See id. at 1,847-48.
97. See id at 9,384 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
98. See id. (“Some of these folks distribute drugs themselves or have their staff distribute drugs, [and]
get kickbacks from drug sales . . . .”).
99. See id. (“Some of these folks . . . have thinly veiled drug messages on their promotional flyers,
tell security to ignore drug use or sales, or send patients who need medical attention to a hospital across
town so that people won’t link emergency room visits with their club.”).
100. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, 70 tbl.20 (2020) (§ 2D1.8). See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.8 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2021). In 2020, only fifty-nine defendants in total were sentenced under this statue.
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra.
101. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 100, at 109 tbl. D-1.
102. Kreit, supra note 42, at 431 n.101.
103. Id. at 431.
104. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
105. United States v. Mei-Fen Chen, 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990).
106. Id. at 185-87.
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instructed the jury that the knowledge element of § 856 could be satisfied if Chen
“deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to her.”107
At trial, Chen maintained that she lacked the culpable knowledge despite testimony
of her direct involvement from two undercover police officers, four former tenants,
and two Houston police officers.108 Chen argued that the deliberate ignorance
instruction was inappropriate because she could not be both deliberately ignorant of
the drug activity at the motel and guilty of operating the motel “for the purpose of”
drug activity.109 Therefore, the issue before the court was “whether the phrase ‘for
the purpose of’ in” § 856(a)(1) and (a)(2) conflicted with the instruction.110
For (a)(1), the court held that the deliberate ignorance instruction was
inappropriate because the phrase “for the purpose of” applied to Chen, and one
cannot be deliberately ignorant, yet “still have the purpose of engaging in illegal drug
activities.”111 The court reasoned that the purpose requirement in (a)(1) applied “to
the person who opens or maintains the place for the illegal activity” based on “plain
language of the statute.”112 It explained that this interpretation was “unambiguous”
and that any other interpretation would “twist the clear and plain language of the
statue.”113
For (a)(2), however, the court concluded that the deliberate ignorance
instruction was appropriate because the purpose requirement in (a)(2) applied to
Chen’s motel guests and not to Chen herself.114 Despite finding the phrase “for the
purpose of” unambiguous under (a)(1), the court interpreted (a)(2) differently,
allowing the conviction to stand.115 The court reasoned that the purpose requirement
referred to different people in (a)(1) and (a)(2) because “any other interpretation
would render § 856(a)(2) essentially superfluous.”116 According to the Fifth Circuit,
(a)(2) was “designed to apply to the person who knowingly allowed others to engage
in those activities by making the place ‘available for use . . . for the purpose of
unlawfully’ engaging” in drug activity.117

107. Id. at 187 (defining “[d]eliberate [i]gnorance” as “a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment . . .
[or] willful blindness to the existence of the fact”).
108. Id. at 185-88.
109. Id. at 187.
110. Id. at 188.
111. Id. at 188-90.
112. Id. at 190.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 191 (explaining that “§ 856(a)(2) does not require the person who makes the place available
to others for drug activity to possess the purpose of engaging in illegal activity; the purpose in issue is that
of the person renting or otherwise using the place”).
115. See id. at 189-90.
116. Id. at 190 (explaining that “a statute should be construed so that each of its provisions is given its
full effect” and that “interpretations which render parts of a statute inoperative or superfluous are to be
avoided”) (quoting Duke v. Univ. of Texas, 663 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1981)). See generally Surplusage
Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[I]f possible, every word and every provision in a
legal instrument is to be given effect.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174-79 (2012).
117. Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.

2022]

UNITED STATES V. SAFEHOUSE

317

Other courts have adopted the construction of § 856(a)(2) in Chen, but none
have independently interpreted the meaning of “for the purpose of.”118 For example
in United States v. Tamez the Ninth Circuit based its reasoning “exclusively ‘on the
logic of Chen.’”119 Similarly, the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have
reasoned that a defendant can violate (a)(2) based on the purpose of a third party.120
The First Circuit has neither adopted the construction of Chen nor had an opportunity
to interpret the meaning of “for the purpose of” in (a)(2).
Because Safehouse was the first supervised consumption site to attempt to open
in the United States, no court had ever applied § 856(a)(2) to this type of facility.
However, the Chen construction led federal officials and some academics to suspect
that a supervised consumption site would violate federal law.121
III. UNITED STATES V. SAFEHOUSE
A. Procedural History
In February 2019, the DOJ sued Safehouse and sought a declaratory judgment
that its plan to open a supervised consumption site would violate 21 U.S.C. §
856(a)(2).122 The government argued that Safehouse’s site would violate federal law
because Safehouse would “knowingly and intentionally provide a place for drug
users to use controlled substances unlawfully.”123 Grounding its argument on the
purpose requirements of § 856(a)(2) articulated in Chen, the government asserted
that if the third parties who used the consumption room had the purpose of using
drugs at the consumption room, Safehouse’s proposal would violate the statute.124
In response, Safehouse sought a declaratory judgment that its proposed operation
would not violate § 856(a)(2).125
The key issue in this case was the construction of § 856(a)(2). Specifically, the
district court and the Third Circuit had to determine what it means under § 856(a)(2)
to “manage or control [a] place . . . and knowingly and intentionally . . . make [it]
available for use . . . for the purpose of unlawfully . . . using a controlled
substance.”126
118. See United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“The other Circuits
that have endorsed Chen’s interpretation have largely done so without question, simply citing the rule
against surplusage and choosing not to engage in independent analysis of the statute.”).
119. United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1991).
120. United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Banks, 987, F.2d
463, 466 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2013).
121. See Kreit, supra note 42, at 441-42 (“[S]afe injection facilities seem to be on very shaky ground
under federal law.”); sources cited supra note 58, 60.
122. Complaint at 8, United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 2:19-cv00519-GAM).
123. Id. at 6.
124. United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Safehouse’s Motion for
Declaratory Judgment at 4-9, United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 2:19cv-00519-GAM).
125. Defendant Safehouse’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims to Plaintiff’s Complaint,
and Third-Party Complaint at 44, United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No.
2:19-cv-00519-GAM).
126. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
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Safehouse’s case was initially successful. In October 2019, the district court
held that the supervised consumption rooms would not violate § 856(a)(2) “because
Safehouse [did] not plan to operate them ‘for the purpose of’ unlawful drug use
within the meaning of the statute.”127 First, based on the natural reading and the
legislative history of § 856(a), the court determined that Safehouse — not the users
of the consumption room — had to act “for the purpose of unlawfully . . . using a
controlled substance.”128 Second, the district court determined that to violate §
856(a)(2), Safehouse had to act with “a significant purpose to facilitate drug use.”129
The court reasoned that because Safehouse planned to make their consumption room
available “for the purposes of reducing the harm of drug use, administering medical
care, encouraging drug treatment, and connecting participants with social services”
they did not act with the requisite purpose.130 Thus, the court concluded that
Safehouse’s supervised consumption room would not violate the statute.131
B. The Third Circuit
On appeal in January 2021, the Third Circuit held that Safehouse’s supervised
consumption room would violate § 856(a)(2) “[b]ecause Safehouse knows and
intends that its visitors will come with a significant purpose of doing drugs.”132
The Third Circuit first had to determine who had to act “for the purpose” of drug
activity. According to the majority, the statute does not require the government to
prove that Safehouse opened the consumption room “for the purpose of” unlawful
drug activity but only that Safehouse’s “tenant or visitor had a purpose to
manufacture, distribute or use drugs.”133 The majority based its construction on both
the plain text of the statute and the rule against surplusage, mirroring the reasoning
of Chen.134 Each reasoning will be discussed in turn.
First, the court reasoned that its construction was supported by the plain text.
To reach this conclusion, Judge Bibas, who wrote the majority opinion, compared
the words and structure of (a)(1) and (a)(2).135 For (a)(1) the majority concluded that
the paragraph requires one actor, the defendant, to “open, lease, rent, use, or
maintain” a place “for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using a
controlled substance.”136 Thus, to prove a violation of (a)(1) the government must
prove that the defendant had the requisite purpose.137
However, the majority also concluded that the plain text supported a different
construction of (a)(2). The majority reasoned that the verbs of (a)(2) contemplate an

127. United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
128. Id. at 595-605.
129. Id. 618.
130. Id. at 614.
131. Id. at 618.
132. United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2021).
133. Id. at 233.
134. Compare United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 233-37 (3d Cir. 2021), with United States v.
Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 189-91 (5th Cir. 1990).
135. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 233-35.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 233-35.
137. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 233.
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unmentioned third party in addition to the defendant.138 The defendant is the actor
who must “manage or control” the place and then “rent, lease, profit from, or make
[the place] available for use.”139 The court reasoned that the second group of verbs
creates the requirement of a third party.140 The third party is the tenant that the
landlord rents or leases the place to, the customer that the business owner profits
from, or the person that the defendant makes a place available for.141 Therefore, in
(a)(2), it is the third party that is the actor who does the drug activity.142 Accordingly,
the majority concluded that because this third party is contemplated by the statute,
and because they are the actor who does the unlawful drug activity, the purpose
requirement in (a)(2) refers to the third-party.143
Second, the court reasoned that an interpretation of § 856(a)(2) that requires the
government to prove that Safehouse acted “for the purpose of” drug activity would
make (a)(2) redundant with (a)(1).144 Although (a)(1) “requires just one actor” the
majority explained that it does not “forbid third parties.”145 Therefore, a defendant
can be guilty of violating (a)(1) if they manufacture, distribute, or use drugs with a
third person.146 Thus, if the government was required to prove that the defendant
acted “for the purpose of” drug activity under (a)(2), then (a)(2) would not cover any
activity that was not already covered by (a)(1).147
After the majority determined who had to act “for the purpose of” unlawfully
using a controlled substance, the next question was whether that actor had the
requisite purpose. Accordingly, the majority’s reasoning focused on whether the
participants of the consumption room acted “for the purpose of” using drugs. The
court concluded that Safehouse would violate § 856(a)(2) as long as its participants
have a “significant purpose” of using drugs.148 This means that using drugs at
Safehouse must be more than the participant’s “merely incidental” purpose,149 but it
does not need to be their “sole purpose.”150 The court held that using drugs would
be a significant purpose for any participants at Safehouse despite the other medical,
counseling, and social work services offered.151 According to the majority, because
Safehouse’s “main attraction” would be the consumption room and its other services
make it safer to use drugs, any reason a participant has for going to Safehouse “is
bound up with the significant purpose of doing drugs.”152

138. Id. at 234.
139. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2); Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 234.
140. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 234.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 235 (“The third party does the last set of actions: she ‘manufacture[s], stor[es], distribut[es],
or us[es] a controlled substance’ (or at least has the purpose to do so).”).
143. Id. at 234-35.
144. See id. at 235-36. The majority reasoned that this construction would also create a redundancy
between (a)(2)’s intent requirement and its purpose requirement. Id.
145. Id. at 234.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 235.
148. Id. at 237-38.
149. Id. at 235 (citing United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
150. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 235 (citing United States. v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)).
151. Id. at 237-38. See generally SAFEHOUSE, supra note 57.
152. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 238.
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C. Dissent and District Court’s Construction
In a fiery dissent, Judge Roth argued that Safehouse’s supervised consumption
room did not violate § 856(a)(2) because Safehouse was “not motivated at least in
part by a desire for unlawful drug activity to occur.”153 According to the dissent, the
majority’s construction “criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct, based solely on
the ‘purpose’ of a third party who is neither named nor described in the statute.”154
To reach this conclusion, the dissent argued that the majority twisted the meaning of
the statute to a point where “identical words have different meanings, different words
are superfluous and two plus two equals five.”155 Judge Roth agreed with the district
court’s analysis that § 856(a)(2) requires the defendant, in this case Safehouse, to act
“for the purpose of” drug activity and that the proposed supervised consumption site
would not be operated with that purpose.156
Counter to the majority’s interpretation and the interpretation in Chen, the
dissent and the district court concluded that (a)(1) and (a)(2) do not overlap and that
the plain text does not support the majority’s construction. The dissent explained
that the difference between § 856(a)(1) and (a)(2) is their actus reus requirement.157
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) has one element: a person must “open, lease, rent, use, or
maintain [a] place.”158 Section (a)(2) has two elements: (i) a person must “manage
or control [a] place,” and (ii) that person must also “rent, lease, profit from, or make
[the place] available for use.”159 None of these elements overlap, therefore, there is
no surplusage. The dissent expressed that the majority was wrong to rely on Chen
and its progeny.160 Since Chen, the only change to the actus reus elements were the
addition of “rent” and “lease” to (a)(1).161 Thus, Judge Roth criticized the majority
for “twist[ing] the text of the statute based on the potential overlap of two words.”162
Because there is no overlap in (a)(1) and (a)(2), the different sections apply in
different situations. As the district court explained, (a)(1) “refers to one’s use of their
property for their own drug activity.”163 On the other hand, (a)(2) “refers to one

153. Id. at 251 (Roth, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. (comparing the majority’s construction to a George Orwell Novel).
156. See id. at 246-47 (Roth, J., dissenting); United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 599
(E.D. Pa. 2019).
157. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting). See generally Actus Reus, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime and
that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability.”).
158. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); see Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2); see Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
160. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
161. Id. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (1990) (amended 2003), with 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2021).
162. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting). This is a potential overlap because “rent” and
“lease” can mean different things depending on the circumstances. Safehouse argued that there was no
overlap between the terms, citing the cannon of noscitur a sociis, because in (a)(1) “rent” and “lease” refer
to a tenant’s actions while the same terms are used in (a)(2) to refer to a landlord’s actions. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 20 n.9, Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225 (No. 21-276). See generally Noscitur a Sociis,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[T]he meaning of an unclear word or phrase, esp[ecially]
one in a list, should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.”).
163. United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 600 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
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making property available for the purpose of others engaging in drug activity.”164 As
Judge Roth explained, “a property owner [who] sells drugs from his home but does
not let others use it” would only violate (a)(1).165 The drug dealer violates (a)(1)
because they “use” or “maintain” the house “for the purpose of” their personal drug
sales.166 They do not violate (a)(2) because they do not act “for the purpose of”
others engaging in drug activity on their property.167 Alternatively, if “a rave
operator encourages drug dealers to attend events to increase attendance,” they
would violate (a)(2) but not (a)(1).168 The rave operator is culpable under (a)(2)
because, by encouraging drug dealers to attend the event, they intend to “profit from”
the third party’s drug activity.169 They do not violate (a)(1) because they do not “use”
or “maintain” the venue “for the purpose of” their own drug activity.170
The dissent and the district court also concluded that their interpretation is
supported by the “presumption of consistent usage” and therefore conforms to the
plain text of the statute.171 According to this rule of statutory construction, “if a
phrase has a clear meaning in one portion of a statute, but the meaning is less clear
in a related section, courts should presume that the phrase carries the same meaning
in both.”172 The dissent and district court explained that their construction is
supported by the presumption of consistent usage because the phrase “for the purpose
of” refers to the defendant’s purpose in both § 856(a)(1) and (a)(2).173 As the district
court explained:
Through canons must be applied with caution, the presumption of consistent usage
carries inherent logical force where, as here, the two provisions in question are part
of the same subsection, were enacted together, and use the phrase in the same way.
In that regard, the presumption of consistent usage canon is one that directs the court
to focus on how Congress used terms within the structure of a statute, reducing the
risk of judges importing a meaning of their own. “For the purpose of” in (a)(1)
clearly and undisputedly refers to the purpose of the actor accused of violating the
provision. Although the implication in (a)(2) that third parties will use the place in
question may make the purpose clause there less clear to some readers than in (a)(1),
courts should presume – absent context indicating otherwise – that the clause carries
the same meaning. That is, courts should presume that (a)(2) requires that the
[defendant] act “for the purpose of” drug activity.174

According to the dissent, the majority’s construction violates the presumption
of consistent usage because it results in two different meanings of the phrase “for the
164. Id.
165. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
166. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); see Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
167. § 856(a)(2); see Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
168. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
169. § 856(a)(2); see Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
170. § 856(a)(1); see Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting).
171. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 245 (Roth, J., dissenting); United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d
583, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2019). See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 170-73 (explaining that
under the presumption of consistent usage “[a] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout a text; [and] a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.”).
172. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 597 (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 170).
173. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting); Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 597.
174. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 597-98.
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purpose of” in § 856(a)(1) and (a)(2).175 In (a)(1) “for the purpose of” refers to the
purpose of the defendant but in (a)(2) “for the purpose of” refers to the purpose of
the third party.176 This interpretation violates the presumption that a word or phrase
“bear[s] the same meaning throughout a text.”177 As the dissent and district court
explained, this was just as egregious, if not more, in Chen.178 Before the 2003
amendment, the phrase “for the purpose of” was the only overlap between (a)(1) and
(a)(2).179 Instead, as the dissent explained, “Chen and its progeny decided that, to
avoid superfluity, the only words that were the same between the two sections must
have different meanings.”180
Next, in order to determine whether Safehouse violated § 856(a)(2), the dissent
and the district court applied their construction of (a)(2) to determine whether
Safehouse acted “for the purpose of” drug activity. The dissent determined that in
order to act “for the purpose of” drug activity, the defendant must be “motivated at
least in part by a desire for unlawful drug activity to occur.”181 Similarly, the district
court determined that the statute requires the defendant to have “a significant
purpose[] to facilitate, rather than reduce, unlawful drug use.”182
Both the dissent and the district court determined that Safehouse did not meet
this standard because the purpose of the supervised consumption room is to reduce
drug use. The dissent concluded that Safehouse’s Consumption Room would be
made available “for the purpose of providing medical care to people who would
otherwise do drugs on the street and risk overdose.”183 Therefore, even though
participants would be allowed to use drugs at the facility, the dissent explained that
Safehouse would not be motivated by a desire for unlawful drug activity to occur
because “Safehouse does not prefer that participants choose the Consumption Room”
over drug treatment or the other services offered.184 Furthermore, the dissent
concluded that even though Safehouse may desire that participants “use drugs in the
Consumption Room, as opposed to the street, [this] does not imply that Safehouse
desires that they use drugs at all.”185 This is because participants would be required
175. The majority’s contention is that, under its construction, “for the purpose of” means the same
thing in (a)(1) and (a)(2) but is applied to different actors. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 235-36.
176. Id.
177. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 170-73; see also Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 245 (Roth, J.,
dissenting); Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 597, 600 (district court opinion).
178. See Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J. dissenting); Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 597, 599-603
(district court opinion).
179. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting). Compare 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (1990) (amended
2003) (statute applied in Chen), with 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2021) (statute applied in Safehouse).
180. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting) (“There is no rule of construction that supports
or even permits such a reading.”).
181. Id. at 251 (explaining that when a statute uses the phrase “for the purpose of” the focus is on the
defendant’s motivations).
182. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 607-08, 614 (district court opinion) (“[O]ne who makes a place
available to another for a purpose other than drug use does not necessarily violate § 856(a)(2) even if they
know some consumption of drugs therein occurs in addition to that other lawful purpose.”).
183. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 251-52 (Roth, J., dissenting); see also Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 614
(district court opinion) (describing Safehouse’s purpose as “reducing the harm of drug use, administering
medical care, encouraging drug treatment, and connecting participants with social services”).
184. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 252 (Roth, J., dissenting). See generally SAFEHOUSE, supra note 57.
185. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 252 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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to supply their own drugs and thus, “Safehouse likely believes that participants
would use drugs regardless of whether the Consumption Room is available.”186
Thus, as the district court explained, any desire that drug use occur in the
Consumption Room is secondary “to the purpose of ensuring proximity to medical
care while users are vulnerable to fatal overdose.”187
D. Conclusions
Subsequently, Safehouse’s petition for rehearing en banc188 and its petition for
certiorari were denied.189 Thus, United States v. Safehouse is currently the lone
authority applying 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) to supervised consumption sites. However,
this issue is far from settled. As deaths from drug overdoses continue to rise, many
localities will continue to propose supervised consumption sites in spite of the Third
Circuit opinion.190 There are several reasons that future courts should adopt the
dissent and district court’s construction over that of the Third Circuit.
Although the majority claimed that its construction was based solely on the plain
text of § 856(a)(2),191 the plain text is ambiguous.192 In Safehouse, four judges
interpreted the phrase “for the purpose of” in the statute: two judges in the majority
interpreted the phrase one way,193 while the dissent and the district court interpreted
the language another way.194 The majority concluded that the language of the statute
was clear.195 However, it is grammatically ambiguous whether the phrase “for the
purpose of” in § 856(a)(2) applies to the defendant or a third party. The majority
ignores the equally plausible interpretation that “for the purpose of” refers to the
defendant in both (a)(1) and (a)(2) and the presumption that identical words used in
different parts of the same statute are intended to have the same meaning.196
Furthermore, the majority does not acknowledge the consequences of tying criminal
liability to the mental state of a third party.
The dissent and the district court recognized that the statute is ambiguous and
“nearly incomprehensible.”197 To resolve the ambiguity the dissent and the district
court looked to the legislative history and the absurd consequences of the majority’s

186. Id.
187. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 614 (district court opinion).
188. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, reh’g denied, 991 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. 2021).
189. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021) (mem.).
190. See, e.g., Mays & Newman, supra note 53.
191. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 233-36.
192. See generally Ambiguity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Uncertainty of meaning
based . . . on a semantic dichotomy that gives rise to any of two or more quite different but almost equally
plausible interpretations.”).
193. See Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 233-37.
194. See Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 244-51 (Roth, J., dissenting); United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp.
3d 583, 595-613 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
195. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 233-36.
196. See Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 244-51 (Roth, J., dissenting); Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 595605.
197. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 244 (Roth, J., dissenting). Even the government acknowledged that the
language of the statute is poorly written. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225
(No. 20-1422); see also Safehouse, 991 F.3d at 507 (McKee, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing opinion).
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formalistic interpretation.198 The Third Circuit avoided this history by claiming that
their construction was based solely on the plain text of the statute.199 For the reasons
discussed, plain meaning does not resolve the ambiguity. What is clear, however, is
that Congress did not intend to criminalize people who act to reduce drug use.
The legislative history does not support criminalizing otherwise innocent
conduct based solely on the mental state of a third party. Then-Senator Biden’s
comments reveal that Congress intended the defendant to act “for the purpose of”
unlawful drug activity.200 Notably, in response to concerns that the 2003 amendment
would reach businesses who knew that drug use would occur on their property but
did not condone or encourage it, Biden explained that his bill targeted “rogue
promoters.”201 According to Biden, the defendant must “not only know that there is
drug use at their event but also hold the event for the purpose of illegal drug use or
distribution.”202 The majority’s construction is in direct conflict with this statement.
Under the majority’s formalistic construction, the promoter would violate 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(2) if the third-party attendees of the event intended to use illegal drugs
regardless of the promoter’s plans for the event.
Furthermore, the legislative history confirms that acting “for the purpose of”
drug activity requires the defendant to be motivated by a desire for unlawful drug
activity to occur “for the purpose of” facilitating drug use. In 1986, Congress
contemplated the harm of crack cocaine and crack houses.203 It follows that those
lawmakers originally envisioned § 856 as a statute that would target places designed
to facilitate drug use and the people who operated such places. When Congress
amended § 856 in 2003, it contemplated the harm of ecstasy and raves.204 At no
point in the legislative history did Congress consider whether harm reduction
strategies intended to reduce death and drug use would be included in the statute.
Despite the government’s claim that Congress contemplated this kind of facility,205
this assertion is unsupported.206 Although Congress expanded the potential reach of
the statute in 2003, the expansion was limited to events that encourage drug use and
a “defendant’s predatory behavior.”207 Although the statute clearly applies beyond
the specific locations of crack houses and raves, the majority’s mechanistic
construction expands criminal liability to anyone who knowingly and intentionally
allows a person to use drugs on their property regardless of whether they approve of
the use or not. As the dissent explains, this includes people who allow others to use

198. See Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247-51 (Roth, J., dissenting); Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 60103, 605, 611-13 (district court opinion). See generally Formalistic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (“Involving adherence to matters of form, . . . at the expense of concerns about substance.”).
199. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 238-39.
200. See discussion supra Section II.C.
201. 149 CONG. REC. 9,384 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
202. Id.
203. See discussion supra Section II.B.
204. See discussion supra Section II.C.
205. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Safehouse, 995 F.3d 225 (No. 20-1422).
206. United States v. Safehouse, 991 F.3d 503, 511 (3d Cir. 2021) (denial of rehearing opinion)
(explaining that the government did not present evidence to support this claim).
207. See 149 CONG. REC. 9,383 (2003) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
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their property “despite their knowledge that drug use will occur, [but] not for the
purpose that drug use occur.”208
The dissent correctly argues that the majority’s construction violates the
absurdity doctrine, a canon of statutory construction that allows judges to interpret a
statute in a way that avoids absurd results.209 For example, consider a parent who,
fearing that they will lose their adult child to an opioid overdose, encourages their
child to move back home.210 The parent knows that the child will continue to use
drugs but believes that their child will be safer because they will be there to
administer naloxone and seek further medical attention. If these parents were
Mainers, this practice would be consistent with the guidance of the Maine Office of
Behavioral Health.211 Yet, regardless of their motivations, under the majority’s
construction, these parents would be in violation of § 856(a)(2).
This arrangement is analogous to supervised consumption sites. Like
Safehouse, the parents “manage or control” the home and “knowingly and
intentionally” make it available to a person who uses drugs.212 Like the consumption
room participants, the child uses the home “for the purpose of” drug use.213 The
majority avoids this result by assuming that the child’s drug use would be
“incidental” to their use of the home.214 According to the majority, the child uses the
home “for the purpose of” eating, sleeping, and bathing.215 However, the majority
overlooks the possibility that the child could be motivated to move in with their
parents solely “for the purpose of” using drugs.216
Under the dissent and district court’s construction, the parents do not violate the
statute. This is because unlawful drug activity is not what motivates the parents to
open their home.217 The parent’s clear motivation is a desire to keep their child alive.
However, under the majority’s construction, these same parents could face up to
twenty years in federal prison.218
IV. POLICY
The dissent and district court’s construction would also save lives. People who
use drugs at supervised consumption sites do not die.219 Allowing people to use
drugs in safe and hygienic conditions supports the overall goals of a harm reduction

208. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 250 (Roth, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting). See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 234-37
(explaining the absurdity doctrine).
210. Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 247-48 (Roth, J., dissenting).
211. OPTIONS, supra note 31.
212. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2); see Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 248 (Roth, J., dissenting).
213. See Safehouse, 985 F.3d at 248 (Roth, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 238.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 248 (Roth, J., dissenting).
217. See id.
218. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(b).
219. See Potier et al., supra note 50, at 62 (“In the [seven studies evaluated], no death by overdose was
ever reported within the [supervised consumption sites] in which this parameter was evaluated.”); see also
Insite User Statistics, supra note 46 (explaining that there have been zero deaths at Insite’s supervised
consumption site despite 3.6 million visits and 6,440 overdose interventions).
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strategy. Studies show that supervised consumption sites attract the most
marginalized people who use drugs, create safer injection conditions, and increase
access to health care.220 Communities as a whole benefit from less drug use in public
places.221 These same studies show that supervised consumption sites accomplish
these goals without increasing crime, drug trafficking, or the number of people who
use drugs.222
Furthermore, supervised consumption sites would be consistent with the harm
reduction strategy already in place in Maine.223 The state is relying on naloxone
distribution to stop the rise in overdose deaths, distributing over 100,000 doses since
2019.224 The Maine Office of Behavioral Health warns people who use drugs that
naloxone is the only way to reverse an overdose.225 To ensure that someone is
present to administer life-saving measures, the state advises people to use drugs in
the company of others;226 and, to encourage people to seek medical attention after an
overdose, the state extends limited criminal immunity to people at the scene of an
overdose.227 Finally, the state has taken steps to ensure that the person responding
to a 911 call, whether a member of law enforcement or an EMT, will be armed with
naloxone.228
Supervised consumption sites simply move these existing practices indoors. For
the vast majority of participants, a visit to a consumption room will be uneventful.
They will use their drug of choice, access the integrated services offered, and go on
with their day. If a participant experiences an overdose, naloxone and oxygen will
be administered immediately. Because of this intervention, that participant will live.
They will not die waiting for a first responder to arrive. They will not die because
their companions feared arrest and failed to get them help. They will not have to
rely on friends and family to administer naloxone. They will not die alone.
V. THE FUTURE OF SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION SITES IN MAINE
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
Much like § 856(a)(2)’s text, the future of supervised consumption sites in
Maine is unclear. However, before a federal judge in Maine interprets § 856(a)(2),
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maine will have to decide whether they
will use limited federal law enforcement resources to interfere with local efforts to
save lives. It remains to be seen whether the Biden DOJ will prosecute supervised
consumption sites with the same zeal as the Trump DOJ. Early signs suggest that it

220. See Potier et al., supra note 50, at 48.
221. See id. at 63.
222. See id.
223. See discussion supra Section I.B.
224. MARGARET CHASE SMITH POL’Y CTR., supra note 34, at 2 tbl.1.
225. OPTIONS, supra note 31.
226. Id.
227. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1111-B (2021); P.L. 2022, ch. 724 (expanding Maine’s Good Samaritan Law).
228. See MARGARET CHASE SMITH POL’Y CTR., supra note 34, at 1, 2 tbl. 1 (reporting 9,172 doses of
naloxone distributed to law enforcement agencies from July 2019 through June 2021); P.L. 2021, ch. 161
(establishing that an emergency medical services person may distribute naloxone).
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may not;229 notably, the Biden DOJ waived its right to file a response to Safehouse’s
petition for certiorari.230 As discussed above, the position that supervised
consumption sites violate federal law is counter to President Biden’s own comments
from his days as a Senator.231
Furthermore, non-enforcement of supervised consumption would be similar to
the federal government’s approach to legalized marijuana. In 2013, the DOJ adopted
a non-enforcement policy232 which has allowed a thriving marijuana industry to
develop in eighteen states and the District of Columbia despite violations of federal
law including § 856(a)(2). For example, consider a landlord who leases a
commercial property to a recreational marijuana retailor. The landlord violates §
856(a)(2) because they “manage or control [the property] . . . as an owner . . . and
knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make [the property] available
for use . . . for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or
using [marijuana.]”233 Nonetheless, the marijuana industry has continued to operate
without significant interference from the federal government.234 The DOJ could
similarly defer to state governments that choose to implement supervised
consumption sites as part of their harm reduction strategy. It is compelling to note
that compared to legalized marijuana, supervised consumption sites are less likely to
impact neighboring states and their impact on the national market for controlled
substances would be minimal.235
B. District of Maine and the First Circuit
Despite the Third Circuit’s decision in Safehouse, prospective supervised
consumption sites in Maine should not be discouraged. The competing constructions
of § 856(a)(2) show that the plain text alone cannot determine whether supervised
consumption sites violate federal law.
Notably, the First Circuit has yet to adopt the questionable reasoning of Chen
and Safehouse. Therefore, if the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maine
prosecutes a supervised consumption site, the First Circuit would have the
opportunity to independently interpret the meaning of § 856(a)(2). At this point, the
court would have to choose whether to adopt the formalistic interpretation of the
Third Circuit — ignoring the clear legislative intent and the absurd results that follow
from it — or adopt the construction of the dissent and district court. Under the

229. Jennifer Peltz & Michael Balsamo, Justice Dept. Signals it May Allow Safe Injection Sites,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Feb. 8, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/business-health-new-york-c4e6d999583
d7b7abce2189fba095011 [https://perma.cc/CX5F-XG93] (“[T]he Justice Department said it is
‘evaluating’ such facilities and talking to regulators about ‘appropriate guardrails.”)
230. Waiver, United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345
(2021) (mem.).
231. See discussion supra Section II.C.
232. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013); see
also Kreit, supra note 42, at 437.
233. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). The retailor violates § 856(a)(1) because they “knowingly open, lease,
rent, use, or maintain any place . . . for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using [marijuana].”
See § 856(a)(1).
234. Kreit, supra note 42, at 437-38.
235. Kreit, supra note 42, at 438.
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dissent and district court’s construction, a person violates § 856(a)(2) when they act
“for the purpose” of facilitating drug use. This construction punishes the people who
act to promote drug use and ignores those who act to reduce it. It also aligns with the
intent of the legislators who designed and ultimately passed the statute. Further, it
supports the obvious conclusion that supervised consumption sites are not crack
houses or raves. Most importantly, it saves lives.

